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from side to side to frighten passengers in the rumble seat; a convic-
tion of second degree murder was affirmed by the Supreme Court of
North Carolina.
Texas, also, has upheld convictions of murder where the defendant
was intoxicated and showing off. Cockrell v. State26 upheld a convic-
tion of murder when the defendant was intoxicated and driving at
a high rate of speed. The defendant swerved to frighten some pedes-
trians, one of whom he struck and killed. The later case of Lopez v.
State27 affirmed a conviction on the same grounds.
28
The cases of murder by the intoxicated motorist fall into two prin-
cipal categories. States like Tennessee give controlling consideration
to the intoxication of the defendant. Other states, like North Carolina,
require that the defendant, in addition to being intoxicated, engage
in some form of showing off. The Tennessee position has been the
subject of some criticism. 29 A motorist should suffer criminal liability
when his intoxicated condition causes the death of another person,
and it seems the "showing off" analysis is the preferable theory to
apply in this instance.
JOHN H. TATE JR.
ASSUMPTION OF RISK IN THE USE OF ICY SIDEWALKS
Assumption of risk is a well recognized doctrine in tort actions
involving personal injuries caused by slipping or falling on icy side-
walks.' Often, the doctrine is applied to a situation in which a per-
son, who has been injured, knew and appreciated a dangerous condi-
2835 Tex. Grim. 218, 117 S.W.2d 11o5 (x938).
"i6, Tex. Grim. 454, 286 S.W.2d 424 (1956).
1Texas convictions are based on Texas Pen. Code Ann. § 802(c) (1948), which
defines the crime of murder without malice [Texas Pen. Code Ann. § 1257(c) (1948)].
E.g., see, Yarborough v. State, 16o Tex. Grim. 239, 268 S.W.2d 154 (1954); Abargo v.
State, 157 Tex. Grim. 264, 248 S.W.2d 490 (1952); Baggett v. State, 154 Tex. Grim.
618, 229 S.W.2d 8oi (1950).
'gNote, 27 Tenn. L. Rev. 417 (i96o); Note, 23 Tenn. L. Rev. 896 (1955); Warren,
Criminal Law and Procedure, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 1179 (1953).
"For discussions of assumption of risk see: Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of
Risk (pts. 1-2), 2o Harv. L. Rev. 14, 19 (1906); James Assumption of Risk, 6i Yale
L.J. 141 (1952); Keeton, Assumption of Risk and the Lanowner, 2o Texas L.
Rev. 562 (1942); Keeton, Personal Injuries Resulting from Open and Obvious
Conditions, 1oo U. Pa. L. Rev. 629 (1952); Paton, Some Problems Relating to
Volenti Non Fit Injuria, 9 Brooklyn L. Rev. 132 (194o); Symposium, Assumption
of Risk, 22 La. L. Rev. i (1961).
CASE COMMENTS
tion, and, nevertheless, voluntarily elected to encounter it.2 A plaintiff
who has assumed the risk cannot recover from a defendant who has
been negligent in permitting the dangerous condition to exist,3 be-
cause of the doctrine known as volenti non fit injuria.4 This doctrine
bars recovery even though the injured person has not been negligent
in encountering the danger, since his decision may have been an en-
tirely reasonable one, and he may even have acted with utmost cau-
tion because he knew of the danger.5 Distinguishable from this doc-
trine is the rule that a person will be denied recovery where he acts
unreasonably in encountering a known risk, and so his conduct
amounts to contributory negligence. Here, a plaintiff is barred from
recovery for two reasons: (a) he has impliedly consented to take a
chance; and (b) the policy of the law is to deny recovery for a loss for
which the plaintiff was at least partially responsible. In such a case,
both assumption of risk and contributory negligence can be used as
defenses. 6 When these two defenses overlap, ordinarily the name given
to the defense makes little difference3 Since the entire conception of as-
sumption of risk is rather vague, application of the doctrine has been
2" 'In the primary and narrower sense the doctrine can apply only when a
contractual relation exists, ordinarily that of master and servant. But in the broader
sense it may apply when no relation by contract exists within the limits of the
maxim vilenti non fit injuria. If one, knowing and comprehending the danger
voluntarily exposes himself to it, though not negligent in so doing, he is deemed
to have assumed the risk and is precluded from a recovery for an injury resulting
therefrom. The maxim is predicted upon the theory of knowledge and appreciation
of the danger and voluntary assent thereto."' Southern Pac. Co. v.. McCready, 47 F.2d
673, 676 (9th Cir. 1931), citing Grover v. Central Vt. Ry., 96 Vt. 208, 118 At. 874,
876 (1922). See also, Fowler v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 121 So. 2d 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 196o); 38 Am. Jur. Negligence § 171 (1941); 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 174 (1950).
'Vestborough Country Club v. Palmer, 204 F.2d 143 (8th Cir. 1953); Schmidt
v. Fontaine Ferry Enterprises, Inc., 319 S.W.2d 468 (Ky. 1958); Strand Enterprises,
Inc. v. Turner, 223 Miss. 588, 78 So. 2d 769 (1955); Landrum v. Roddy, 143 Neb.
934. 12 N.W.2d 82 (1943).
'No legal wrong is done to one who consents. See 44 Words and Phrases Volenti
Non Fit Injuria 599 (perm. ed. 1962).
3Krolikowski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283 F.2d 889 (7 th Cir. 196o); Peirce v. Clavin,
82 Fed. 550 (7 th Cir. 1897); Hunn. v. Windsor Hotel Co., 119 W. Va. 215, 193 S.E.
57 (1937); Hotchkin v. Erdrich, 214 Pa. 46o,, 63 At. 1035 (19o6); Miner v. Con-
necticut River R.R., 153 Mass. 398, 26 N.E. 994 (1891).
'2 Harper and James, Torts § 21.1 (1956).
7Compare the following cases. Assumption of Risk: Pomeroy v. Westfield, 154
Mass. 462, 28 N.E. 899 (1891); Howey v. Fisher, 122 Mich. 43, 8o N.W. 1o04 (1899).
Contributory Negligence: Mosheuvel v. District of Columbia, 191 US. 247 (19o3);
Wright v. City of St. Cloud, 54 Minn. 94, 55 N.W. 819 (1893); Houston, E. & W.T.
Ry. v. McHale, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 360, 105 S.W. 1149 (1907); cf. Poole v. Lutz &
Schmidt, Inc., 273 Ky. 586, 117 S.W.2d 575 (1938).
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variant'and diverse and, at times, courts have appeared to arrive at
contrary decisions8
The recent case of Hansen v. City of Minneapolis,9 in which the
defense of assumption of risk was unsuccessfully asserted by the de-
fendant, illustrates the difficulty of applying the doctrine. The plain-
tiff brought a tort action for injuries suffered when she fell on an icy
sidewalk adjacent to the defendant's office building. She claimed that
the defendant was negligent in permitting an accumulation of ice on
the sidewalk. The defendant denied acting negligently, but, even if it
had, claimed that the accident was due to the plaintiff's assumption
of the risk of injury. A jury verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed on
appeal.
A defective downspout on the defendant's building caused water
to pour onto the alleyway below, which, in freezing weather, resulted
in the formation of a patch of ice on the portion of the alleyway used
as a sidewalk. The plaintiff, in approaching the alleyway, noticed
the surface was different from the rest of the sidewalk, there being
bumps and ridges of ice near the building. The alleyway near the street
was smooth, but occupied by other people. People ahead of her passed
over the rough area with no apparent difficulty. Being concerned with
what was ahead, she did not look down. In crossing the alleyway, she
slipped, fell and was injured: The plaintiff testified that she realized
that anyone who walked on an icy area was in danger of falling, but
that, at the time, she had not thought of the possibility of falling.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the lower court's ruling
that assumption of risk was rightly left to the jury. One dissenting
judge said the plaintiff had assumed the risk as a matter of law.
8Compare the various concepts of the application of assumption of risk which
were used in the following cases: "[T]he application of the [assumption of risk
doctrijne] ... is limited to cases arising out of contractual relationships or the re-
lationship of master and servant." Ward v. Thompson, 57 Wash. 2d 655, 359
P.2d 143, 146 (1961). "Assumption of risk is based, not on contract, but upon the
maxim 'volenti non fit injuria. "' Rase v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry., 107
Minn. 26o, 12o N.W. 360, 361 (igg). "The assumption of risks rests on an agreement,
express or implied, between a master and his servant. Absent the relation of
master and servant, the doctrine has no application." West Tex. Util. Co. v.
Renner, 32 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). "The defense of assumption
of risk 'extends to relations independent of the master-servant relationship." Zim-
mer v. California Co., 174 F. Supp. 757, 763 (D. Mont. 1959). "[A]ssumption
of risk is a form of contributory negligence...." Tosty v. Morgan Co., 151 Wis-
6oi, 139 N.W. 402, 404 (1913). "'Contributory negligence' and 'assumption of risk'
may coexist but they are not synonymous terms." Nodland v. Kreutzer & Wasem,
184 Iowa 476, x68 N.W. 889, 891 (1918).
9113 N.W.2d 508 (Minn. 1962).
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It is well settled that knowledge and appreciation of the danger
by the plaintiff are essential prerequisites to the defense of assumption
of risk.10 The majority in Hansen decided the evidence did not es-
tablish assumption of risk as a matter of law because it was not proven
that she knew and appreciated the danger. The court relied on an
earlier Minnesota case, Schrader v. Kriesel," in which a woman slipped
and fell in an icy rut in a used car lot. She had observed the general
snowy condition of the lot, but she did not see the rut into which she
fell because it was covered with snow. There, the court held that she
had not assumed the risk because the evidence was insufficient to show
that she knew of the dangerous condition.'
2
On the other hand, the dissenting judge relied on Wright v. City
of St. Cloud,13 which he called the leading Minnesota case on assump-
tion of risk concerning the use of icy sidewalks. The plaintiff, also a
woman, received injuries from a fall on an icy and snowy public side-
walk. She testified that she saw the ridge, but had no idea had bad it
was. The court held that she assumed the risk as a matter of law.'
4
From these two lines of reasoning it is apparent that there is con-
siderable difficulty and lack of preciseness in interpreting and apply-
ing the phrase, "knowledge and appreciation of the risk."
The doctrine of assumption of risk as applied to the icy sidewalk
cases contains the following elements: (i) knowledge and appreciation
of the danger; (2) the existence of a reasonable alternative route; and
(3) a voluntary election to encounter the danger.15
1'38 Am. Jur. Negligence § 173 (igffi); 65 C.J.S. Negligence g 174, at 851 (1950);
4 Words and Phrases 622 (perm. ed. 1940).
"232 Minn. 238, 45 N.W.2d 395 (1950)-
"rhe court said: "She cannot be held to have assumed any risk at all unless
the evidence shows that she knew of the peril which she faced. Defendant urges
that Mrs. Schrader assumed the risk of entering his premises, because she testified
that she had noticed the conditions of the car lot both during her visit there on
November 14 and upon her entrance the night of the accident. We think there is
no showing of assumption of risk as a matter of law. Mrs. Schrader testified that
she did not see the rut where she fell and that the ice on the lot was covered
with snow. On this evidence the jury was entitled to find that Mrs. Schrader was
she did not see the rut where she fell and that the ice on the lost was covered
not fully aware of the peril which she faced." 45 N.W.2d at 401.
1354 Minn. 94, 55 N.W. 819 (1893).
uThe court said: "[W]hile plaintiff might not have know of the existence or
location of any particular hollow or hole in this path, it is very clear from her own
testimony that she had full and present knowledge of the precise condition of this
part of the sidewalk, and of the risk incident to traveling over it. The only risk
was that of slipping and falling, and that was perfectly patent to anyone of
ordinary intelligence." 55 N.W. at 82o.
"See: 38 Am. Jur. Negligence § 173 (1941); 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 174 (1950).
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A plaintiff must know of the danger, but he must also fully ap-
preciate and comprehend its possible consequences. 16 There must be
sufficient appreciation of the character and extent of the danger so
that he will be given an adequate basis for voluntary decision whether
or not to take the chance.' 7 In some situations, the danger may be
so obvious that any reasonable person immediately would compre-
hend it and would be put on his guard.' 8 To illustrate: if a person
knows of the existence of an icy spot on a walk and that the ice is
slippery, it much be presumed that he knows that there is a risk of
falling if he steps on it.19 Where it is plain that anyone of normal
intelligence would have realized the hazard involved, the question
of adequate knowledge and appreciation of the risk must be decided by
the court,20 but in cases where the dangerous condition may not be
so obvious, the issue is properly put to the jury.21 If it is decided that
the person knew and comprehended the risk involved, the fact that he
momentarily forgets about it is immaterial. He is still chargeable with
complete and continuing understanding of the condition.22 As these
variables indicate, each case must be examined not from the point of
16"The words 'the risk' denote not only the existence of a risk but also its
extent. Thus, 'knowledge' of the risk involved in a particular condition implies not
only that the condition is recognized as dangerous but also the chance of harm
and the gravity of the threatened harm are appreciated." Restatement, Torts § 340,
commebnt b (1934). See also, Prosser, Torts § 55, at 309 (2d ed. 1955).
17Worden v. Francis, 148 Conn. 459, 172 A.2d 196 (1961); Dean v. Hershowitz,
i i9 Conn. 398, 177 Atl. 262 (1935). See also, 25 Am. Jur. Highways § 462 (1940);
65 C.J.S. Negligence § 174, at 851 (195o); James, Assumption of Risk, 61 Yale L.J.
141, 147 (1952).
'8"At the same time, it is evident that in all such cases an objective standard
must be applied, and that the plaintiff cannot be heard to say that he did not com-
prehend a risk which must have been obvious to him. As in the case of negligence
itself, there are certain risks which anyone of adult age must be taken to appre-
ciate: the danger of slipping on ice, of falling through unguarded openings, of
lifting heavy objects...." Prosser, Torts § 55, at 310 (2d ed. 1955). See also Syver-
son v. Nelson, 245 Minn. 63, 70 N.W.2d 88o (1955); 25 Am. Jur. Highways § 464
(1940).
2"The very idea of ice being slippery implies a risk of falling .... It must fol-
low that if a person knows that ice is slippery he must also know that if he steps
on it there is a risk of falling." Geis v. Hodgman, 255 Minn. 1, 95 N.W.2d 311
(1959)-
2°Lander v. Shannon, 148 Wash. 93, 268 Pac. 145 (1928); Boatman v. Miles, 27
Wyo. 481, 199 Pac. 933 (1921); 38 Am. Jur. Negligence § 349 (1941).
"Gray v. Turner, 350 P.2d 1043 (Colo. 196o); Loney v. Laramie Auto Co., 36
Wyo. 339, 255 Pac. 350 (1927); 38 Am. Jur. Negligence § 349 (1941).
nJacobs v. Southern Ry., 241 U.S.228 (916); Grand Trunk W. Ry. v. Reid,
42 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1930); New York, C. & St. L.R.R. v. McDougall, 15 F.ad 283
(6th Cir. 1926); Ferrie v. D'Arc, 31 N.J. 92, 155 A.2d 257 (1959); Cummins v.
Dufault, 18 Wash. 2d 274, 139 P.2d 308 (1943); 25 Am. Jur. Highways § 468 (1940).
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view of a specific test, but with due consideration of all the surround-
ing circumstances. 23 In the Hansen case, the court's contention that
the plaintiff did not have full knowledge of the dangerous condition
because she didn't see the particular bump upon which she fell seems
to be an unnecessary narrowing of the knowledge and appreciation
prerequisite.
24
The second element, that there must be a reasonable, alternative
route for the plaintiff to take, must be present, otherwise it cannot be
said that he assumed the risk by advancing into a known, perilous
situation.25 Obviously, the actor can only decide to assume the risk
where has more than one route from which to choose. The alternative
route must be safe and convenient, and its existence must be known
to the pedestrian.26 If these circumstances exist, and the traveler never-
theless proceeds along the more dangerous route, and is injured, he
will be precluded from recovery for he has assumed the risk of injury.27
This is especially true where a pedestrian could easily avoid a danger-
ous place on a sidewalk, either by crossing over to the other side, by
going out into the street, or by hesitating momentarily to let the
crowd pass by in order to proceed around it on the same sidewalk. 28
In short, choice of the more dangerous way in the face of a reasonably
safe alternative will, nearly always, amount to an assumption of the
risk.29 If no safe alternative is present, assumption of risk cannot
successfully be asserted as a defense. Generally, the burden of proof
rests on the defendant to show that a safer and more convenient
route was reasonably available to the plaintiff.30
As stated previously, the third element is that the actor's decision
to assume the risk of injury must be a completely free and voluntary
one.31 This may be apparent, either from his words or conduct.3 2
'25 Am. Jur. Highways § 463, at 755 (194o).
'See note 14 supra.
'665 C.J.S. Negligence § 174, at 849 (1950); Prosser, Torts § 55, at 312 (2d ed.
1955).
4Annot., 13 A.L.R. 73, 90 (192 1); Annot., 2 1 L.R.A. (Ns.) 614, 659 (1909).
2Patton v. City of Grafton, u6 W. Va. 31, 18o S.E. 267 (1935); Williams v.
Main Island Creek Coal Co., 83 W. Va. 464, 98 S.E. 511 (1919); Boyland v. City of
Parkersburg, 78 W. Va. 749, 90 S.E. 347 (1916); Shriver v. Marion County Ct., 66
W. Va. 685, 66 S.E. 1o62 (191o).
mEvans v. Philadelphia, 205 Pa. 193, 54 At. 775 (1903); Canfield v. City of
Philadelphia, 134 Pa. Super. 590, 4 A.2d 6o5 (1939).
""25 Am. Jur. Highways § 465 (1940); Prosser, Torts § 55, at 313 (2d ed. 1955).
mDonald v. Moses, 254 Minn. 186, 192, 94 N.W.2d 255, 260 (1959); Campion v.
City of Rochester, 202 Minn. 136, 277 N.W. 422 (1938).
3138 Am. Jur. Negligence § 171 (1941); 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 174, at 851 (195o).
See also, James, Assumption of Risk, 61 Yale L.J. 141, 151 (1952); Keeton, Personal
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There is no problem, of course, where a person by express language
voluntarily accepts a risk, but normally this will arise in master and
servant relationships and others based on contract.33 However, such
agreements are not recognized by the courts, where a party, at an ob-
vious disadvantage in bargaining power, is put at the mercy of the
other's negligence.3 4 But, if it appears that the plaintiff fully under-
stood that he was exempting the defendant from liability for any neg-
ligence, the express agreement will be upheld.35 Only in rare cases
would this have application in the sidewalk cases, where the plaintiff
is normally but a traveler on a public pavement. An assumption of
the risk by the pedestrian will almost always be found in his conduct
alone. "The consent is found in going ahead with full knowledge of the
risk." 3 6
In testing for assumption of risk where injuries have been received
by a pedestrian from a fall on an icy sidewalk, the factors discussed
above should always be considered. These prerequisites are necessar-
ily included in every assumption of risk determination based on the
idea that there can be no injury in the eyes of the law to one who
consents, as they, together, make up the definition of the doctrine.
3 7
The second element, alternative route, has been referred to as a corol-
lary and needs to be applied only under certain circumstances,3 8 but
it would seem that in all cases involving this doctrine there must be
knowledge of an alternative route before a voluntary decision to en-
Injuries Resulting from Open and Obvious Conditions, ioo U. Pa. L. Rev. 629,
636 (1952).
31idgway v. Yenny, 223 Ind. 16, 57 N.E.2d 581 (1944); Krause v. Hall, 195 Wis.
565, 217 N.W. 290 (1928).
"Freeman v. United Fruit Co., 223 Mass. 3oo, 111 N.E. 789 (1916); Quimby v.
Boston & Me. R.R., 15o Mass. 365, 23 N.E. 205 (1890); Peterson v. Chicago & N.W.
Ry., 119 Wis. 197, 96 N.W. 532 (igo3). See also, Arensberg, Limitation by Bailees
and by Landlords of Liability for Negligent Acts, 51 Dick. L. Rev. 36 (1947); Keeton,
Assumption of Risk and the Landowner, 22 La. L. Rev. 108, 110 (1961); 4 Mo.
L. Re. 55 (1939).
"Johnston v. Fargo, 184 N.Y. 379, 77 N.E. 388 (19o6); Tarbell v. Rutland R.R.,
73 Vt. 347, 51 At. 6 (19oi); Restatement, Contracts § 575(1) (1932).
"Van Noy Interstate Co. v. Tucker, 125 Miss. 260, 87 So. 643 (1921); Lebkeucher
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 97 N.J.L. 112, 116 At. 323 (Sup. Ct. 1922), aff'd, 98 N.J.L. 271,
118 At. 926 (Ct. Err. & App. 1922); Dodge v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 142 Tenn. 2o,
215 S.W. 274 (1919).
'"Prosser, Torts § 55, at 308 (2d ed. 1955). Also, in Fowler v. Liquid Carbonic
Corp., 121 So. 2d 49, 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 196o), it was said: "[Tjhe plaintiff vol-
untarily entered into a situation involving an obvious and known danger, thus
impliedly assuming the risk of injury...."
3765 C.J.S. Negligence § 174, at 849 (1959).
"9Taylor v. City of Huntington, 126 W. Va. 732, So S.E.2d 14 (1944).
